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ABSTRACT 
 
North-South Trade Liberalization and Returns to Skill in the South: 
The Case of Mexico 
 
This study examines the effect of NAFTA, an instance of North-South trade liberalization, on 
returns to skill in Mexico. Mexico is abundant in low-skill workers relative to the US and 
Canada, and so, by the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade model, NAFTA ought to have 
raised the relative earnings of low-skill workers, that is, lowered returns to skill in Mexico. 
Analysis of Mexican labor micro-data yields the finding that while returns to skill in industries 
producing tradeables have risen, ceteris paribus, since Mexico embarked upon trade 
liberalization by joining the GATT in 1986, this rise was less pronounced by 1999 in 
industries liberalized relatively rapidly by NAFTA, launched in 1994, than in industries 
liberalized relatively slowly by this phased trade treaty. This is considered evidence of 
NAFTA holding back rise in returns to skill, since it is plausible such a dampening would have 
been more marked in industries more rapidly exposed to trade with Mexico’s skill abundant 
northern neighbors. Hence, this study suggests trade with developed nations may lower 
returns to skill in developing nations. It is speculated this may slow the pace of private human 
capital accumulation in developing nations, with negative consequences for their economic 
growth. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  F11, I21 
  
Keywords:  NAFTA, Heckscher-Ohlin model, human capital 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Gautam Hazarika  
Department of Business Administration 
The University of Texas at Brownsville 
80 Fort Brown 
Brownsville, TX 78520 
USA 
E-mail: gautam.hazarika@utb.edu       
 
                
  
I. Introduction 
Neo-Classical theory contends international trade may alter returns to skill and, thereby, the distribution of 
earnings. Indeed, international trade is held by some to be the primary factor in widening earnings inequality in 
the U.S. (for example, Burtless 1995).  The import from less developed countries, the South, of goods intensive 
in the use of low-skill workers has, it is argued, depressed these workers’ earnings in developed countries, the 
North, thereby raising returns to skill and widening earnings inequality. By this argument, North-South trade 
ought to have raised the earnings of low-skill workers and, hence, reduced earnings inequality in the South.  
Consequently, this paper aims to contribute to the body of research examining the effect of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), an instance of North-South trade liberalization, upon returns to 
skill in Mexico. 
This is a worthy subject of study because it is distinctly possible that lowered returns to skill in the 
South upon the opening up of trade with the North shall hinder the South’s ability to realize dynamic gains 
from trade, that is, international trade stimulated economic growth. Grossman and Helpman (1994) summarize 
the reasons why integration into the world economy is an important factor in national economic growth. First, 
a nation integrated into world markets enjoys access to a larger technical knowledge base than an autarky.  
Second, international competition forces domestic firms to be innovative rather than the merely imitative.  
Third, by expanding firms’ customer base, economic integration raises the profitability of industrial research.  It 
is likely these causal connections between international openness and economic growth hinge upon the 
availability of human capital, for a nation’s ability to absorb new technologies from abroad increases in its stock 
of human capital (for example, Tybout 2000), and it is evident that industrial research and development  is a 
human capital intensive endeavor. If rates of return to skill in developing countries were depressed upon the 
liberalization of trade with developed countries, developing countries would see a blunting of private incentives 
to accumulate human capital. With dampened private human capital accumulation, the capacities of developing 
countries to realize dynamic gains from trade may decline.  As it is, the maximum dynamic gains attainable by 
developing nations are limited by the low-technology nature of the goods that static comparative advantage 
dictates they produce (for example, Young 1991).  In addition, lowered private human capital accumulation 
may hold back national economic growth directly, that is, in ways unrelated to international trade (for example, 
Lucas 1988).  Trade liberalization in Mexico may be said to have begun in earnest upon the Nation’s joining the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986. A second momentous event in Mexico’s history of 
trade liberalization was the launch of NAFTA in 1994.  As described by Robertson (2004), the periods 1986 – 
1994 and 1994 – present are notably dissimilar in that the relative prices of skill-intensive goods in Mexico and, 
consequently, the relative earnings of skilled workers, rose between 1986 and 1994, but have fallen thereafter.  
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model predicts that trade based on comparative advantage shall lead to 
increases in the relative prices of goods intensive in the use of a nation’s abundant resource and, therefore, to a 
rise in the relative price of this resource. Since it is commonly believed Mexico is abundant in low-skill workers, 
rise in the relative earnings of skilled workers, that is, fall in the relative earnings of low-skill workers in the 
period of trade liberalization preceding NAFTA is puzzling. Hanson and Harrison (1999) and, more 
successfully, Robertson (2000) contend that Mexico is really abundant in skilled workers in relation to the 
poorer nations that make up much of the world, and so a general liberalization of trade under the terms of the 
GATT in 1986 led to rise in the relative earnings of skilled workers. These authors present evidence that, prior 
to trade liberalization, Mexico protected its low-skill industries more than it did its high-skill industries and that 
liberalization under the GATT then caused tariffs upon the imports of low-skill goods to fall more rapidly than 
those upon the imports of high-skill goods. As a result, the relative prices of low-skill goods declined, causing 
decreases in the relative earnings of low-skill workers and, thus, widening wage inequality. NAFTA, however, 
was different in that it liberalized trade between Mexico and the more skill abundant United States and Canada. 
Therefore, argues Robertson (2004), the relative-prices of high-skill goods in Mexico have fallen since 1994, as, 
hence, have the relative earnings of high-skill workers. In sum, previous research indicates NAFTA lowered 
returns to skill in Mexico. It is the objective of this study to uncover, by means different, additional evidence of 
lowered returns to skill in the South upon the liberalization of its trade with the North.  The principal 
differences between this study and previous such research are that it employs labor micro-data rather than data 
aggregated at the level of firms or industries, and, next, that its empirical strategy exploits the fact that NAFTA 
liberalized trade in some goods faster than trade in others. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the empirical strategy. Section 
III describes the data, and presents and interprets the empirical findings. Section IV summarizes these findings 
and presents the study’s conclusions. 
 II. Empirical Strategy 
NAFTA began liberalizing trade between Mexico and its northern neighbors in 1994. This liberalization was a 
phased process in that some industries experienced a more rapid reduction in import tariffs than others. For 
example, tariffs on some goods were eliminated immediately, that is, in 1994, whereas imports of other goods 
were to become duty-free only by 1998 or later.  In addition, some industries were unaffected by NAFTA, or 
largely so. Industries producing non-tradeables were naturally beyond the scope of NAFTA, those producing 
such supply-managed goods1 as milk, poultry, and eggs, were deliberately excluded from NAFTA, and this 
Preferential Trading Arrangement may have had little effect on Mexico’s maquiladora industry.  
The Mexican government founded a border industrialization program in 1965 in order to combat 
unemployment in the border region resulting from the US’s termination of the bracero program2 in 1964. This 
industrialization program allowed the unrestricted entry of foreign capital into the border region. Manufactured 
goods were to be assembled by cheap Mexican labor from components originating in the United States, for re-
export to the United States. Raw materials imported into Mexico were exempted from import duties and U.S. 
tariffs upon the import of the finished goods were to be levied only on Mexican value added.  This policy 
resulted in the proliferation, by means of mostly U.S. capital, of export oriented manufacturing units, called 
maquiladoras3, along Mexico’s 2,000- mile northern border. Since U.S. import tariffs were levied only upon the 
Mexican value-added portion of the output of maquiladoras, consisting often of the modest value-added by mere 
assembly of U.S. components, tariffs upon these goods were low to begin with, and so NAFTA is unlikely to 
have significantly eased U.S. imports of maquiladora output.  Indeed, even though tariff reduction under 
NAFTA was extended to maquiladoras, the phased nature of tariff reduction implied U.S. import tariffs in the 
maquiladora program may, in the beginning, have been lower than under NAFTA (Gruben 2001).  
In sum, it is possible to distinguish between four sectors of the Mexican economy: the sector 
producing non-tradeables and the few supply-managed tradeables excluded from NAFTA, untouched by this 
Preferential Trading Arrangement, the maquiladora sector, perhaps only marginally affected by NAFTA, the 
sector producing goods the imports of which were liberalized relatively slowly under NAFTA, and the sector 
producing items the imports of which were liberalized relatively rapidly.  It is plausible the first two sectors 
                                                 
1 goods whose domestic supply is restricted so as to raise their prices, ostensibly to benefit their producers 
2 The bracero program was instituted on August 4, 1942, to alleviate a manual labor shortage in the U.S. on 
account of the war. 
3 The term derives from the Spanish verb maquilar, which means ‘to put together or assemble’. were largely unaffected as well by Mexico’s joining the GATT in 1986, since the first produces mainly non-
tradeables, NAFTA’s exclusions being few, and the GATT resulted mainly in sharp reductions in Mexican 
import duties whereas the maquiladora  sector, using raw materials imported duty-free, is entirely export-
oriented.  Might differences between these sectors’ time-trends in rates of return to schooling enable 
identification of the effect of NAFTA, an instance of North-South trade liberalization, upon returns to skill in 
Mexico?  
Liberalized North-South trade shall bring about rise in the relative prices of low-skill goods in the 
South, expansion of the South’s low-skill industries, a rise in demand for low-skill workers, and, hence, 
depression in returns to skill, holds Neo-Classical theory.  Might this occur faster in the sectors of Southern 
economies more rapidly exposed to trade with the North? Note that differences between sectors in time-trends 
in returns to skill may make for inter-sectoral differences, inconsistent with Neo-Classical theory, in the 
compensation of identical workers at a point in time.  However, such differences become plausible in a world 
of industry rents. 
Protected industries enjoy rents (Revenga 1997), and so, prior to NAFTA, high-skill industries in 
Mexico enjoyed rents in relation to these industries in the U.S. and Canada, whereas low-skill industries in the 
U.S. and Canada enjoyed rents compared with these industries in Mexico. Such rents may be passed on to 
workers (Revenga 1997).  It is conceivable that rents shall make up a larger share of the compensation of a 
skilled worker than of the compensation of a low-skill worker in high-skill industries, since their superior 
numbers in these industries may endow skilled workers with greater bargaining power over the division of 
rents.  Similarly, it is plausible that rents shall constitute a larger share of the compensation of a low-skill 
worker than of the compensation of a skilled worker in low-skill industries. Consequently, the whittling down 
of rents in Mexico’s high-skill industries by the import competition effected by NAFTA would have hurt 
Mexican high-skill workers more than low-skill workers. Similarly, the capture by Mexico’s low-skill industries 
of part of the rents of the U.S.’s and Canada’s low-skill industries, facilitated by NAFTA, would have benefited 
Mexico’s low-skill workers more than its high-skill workers.  A fall in measured returns to skill would have 
resulted. Now, consider, for simplicity, two sectors of the Mexican economy, each consisting of a mix of high 
and low skill industries. Say, one was more rapidly exposed to trade with the U.S. and Canada under NAFTA’s 
phased tariff elimination than the other.  It is conceivable that the process described above whereby returns to skill are depressed would occur faster in the more speedily liberalized sector. This logic is the basis of this 
study’s empirical strategy. 
Recall that it is possible to distinguish between four sectors of the Mexican economy: the sector 
producing non-tradeables and goods excluded from NAFTA, untouched by this tripartite treaty, the maquiladora 
sector, perhaps only slightly affected by NAFTA, the sector producing goods the imports of which were 
liberalized relatively slowly under NAFTA, and the sector producing items the imports of which were 
liberalized relatively rapidly.  Consider the two years 1987 and 1999. The former marks the beginnings of 
Mexican trade liberalization under the GATT but precedes the launch of NAFTA by some 7 years. The latter 
marks the complete elimination of tariffs under NAFTA for some, though not all industries.  Imports of goods 
exempted from duties by 1999 under the terms of NAFTA may be considered relatively rapidly liberalized by 
this Preferential Trading Arrangement, whereas imports of goods yet subject to tariffs by 1999 may be deemed 
relatively slowly liberalized.  Consider, now, the Mincer earnings function, fitted to labor micro-data from the 
years 1987 and 1999, 
(1) ln(monthly earnings) = a + X’b 
+ ∑j c1j . (years of schooling ×industry j)  + ∑j c2j .(years of schooling × industry j × year 1999) 
+ d1.(years of schooling × maquila ) + d2.(years of schooling × maquila × year 1999) 
 +  e1.(years of schooling × fastlib ) + e2.(years of schooling × fastlib × year 1999) 
 +  f1.(years of schooling × slowlib ) + f2.(years of schooling × slowlib × year 1999) + u 
where X represents a vector of influences, including personal and environmental characteristics, upon a 
worker’s monthly earnings, industry j signifies employment in industrial class j (farm, manufacturing, commerce, 
etc.), maquila denotes employment in the maquiladora sub-sector of manufacturing, fastlib indicates employment 
in industries producing goods exempted from tariffs by 1999 under the terms of NAFTA, slowlib indicates 
employment in industries producing goods yet subject to tariffs by 1999, and u signifies unobserved random 
influences upon the worker’s log monthly earnings.  As is well known, the coefficient of years of schooling in a 
Mincer earnings function measures the rate of return to schooling, that is, the percentage increase in earnings 
from an additional year of schooling, a common metric of returns to skill. 
This specification of the Mincer earnings function permits rates of return to schooling in 1987 as well 
as changes in these between 1987 and 1999 to differ between broad industrial classes. Industries within these 
classes that produce tradeables, with the exception of the few excluded from NAFTA, are indicated by the variables fastlib and slowlib4, and so changes in rates of return to schooling between 1987 and 1999 measured by 
the coefficients e2  and  f2  may be considered to originate in Mexican  trade liberalization. These are, clearly, 
changes in addition to those measured by the coefficients  c2j  which may, hence, be considered largely secular, 
that is, unrelated to trade liberalization, originating, for example, in skill-biased technical progress. 
The coefficient d2  measures change between 1987 and 1999, in addition to that measured by the 
particular  c2j  relevant to the industrial class of manufacturing,  in the rate of return to schooling of maquiladora 
workers.  As argued, it is likely Mexican trade liberalization under both the GATT and NAFTA had little 
bearing on the prospects of maquiladoras since U.S. import tariffs on the output of maquiladoras were low even 
prior to NAFTA and the principal effect of Mexico’s joining the GATT was greatly lowered Mexican import 
duties whereas maquiladoras, using raw material s imported duty-free, are entirely export-oriented.  Thus, it is 
plausible that the change measured by d2 resulted mainly from factors other than trade liberalization, such as 
skill-biased technical progress.  Note that maquiladoras embody foreign direct investment and there is evidence 
such investment facilitates the transfer of technology across borders (Zhiqiang 2008).  Further, there is 
evidence that firms producing for export markets embrace new technologies faster than firms focused on 
domestic markets (Robertson 2000).  Thus, skill-biased technical progress in the maquiladora sector may have 
been more rapid than in the rest of manufacturing, and so it is conceivable that d2 > 0.  
As argued, changes in rates of return to schooling between 1987and 1999 measured by the 
coefficients e2  and  f2  may be taken to originate in the liberalization of trade.  If the GATT eased imports into 
Mexico of low-skill goods from less developed nations more abundant in low-skill workers, and so hurt 
Mexico’s low-skill industries more than its skill-intensive industries with the result that returns to skill were 
elevated, this trade treaty will have resulted in both e2  and  f2  taking positive values. However, if NAFTA, 
liberalizing trade between Mexico and the more skill-abundant U.S. and Canada, has reversed these earlier 
increases in returns to skill (Robertson 2004), this reversal, by the logic set forth in this study, will have been 
more pronounced by 1999 in the sector, fastlib, producing goods the imports of which were liberalized relatively 
rapidly under NAFTA, than in the sector, slowlib, producing goods the imports of which were liberalized 
relatively slowly, leading to e2 < f2.  If the decline in returns to skill owing to NAFTA has more than offset the 
                                                 
4 While the labels fastlib and slowlib pertain to NAFTA, they really mark all tradeables but for the few excluded 
from the provisions of this tripartite treaty, and so the industries thus labeled would’ve been affected by both 
the GATT and NAFTA. rise in returns to skill brought about by GATT even in the more slowly liberalized sector, it would be that  e2 < 
f2 < 0. 
In sum, whether NAFTA, an instance of North-South trade liberalization, has depressed returns to 
skill in Mexico may be ascertained via a statistical test of the hypothesis e2 < f2.  It may be seen that this paper 
differs in two ways from previous studies of the impact of trade liberalization upon returns to skill in Mexico 
such as by Hanson and Harrison (1999), Robertson (2000), Robertson (2004), and Mollick (2008): it bases 
identification upon the phased nature of NAFTA, that is, the fact that this trade treaty liberalized trade in some 
goods faster than trade in others, and it employs labor micro-data5 rather than data aggregated at the level of 
firms or industries. 
 
III. The Data and Empirical Findings 
The Encuesta National de Empleo Urbano (ENEU), or National Urban Employment Survey, from the years 
1987 and 1999 furnishes the data upon which this study’s empirical analysis is based. As discussed, 1987 marks 
the beginnings of Mexican trade liberalization under the GATT but precedes the launch of NAFTA by some 7 
years, whereas 1999 marks the complete elimination of tariffs under NAFTA for some, though not all 
industries. The ENEU supplies a quarterly data series rich in socio-economic information. In order to avoid 
excessively large, unwieldy sample sizes, the study uses data from but the 2nd quarters of the 1987 and 1999 
ENEU. The ENEU samples from about 60% of the nation’s urban population including about 90% of the 
population in areas with 100,000 or more inhabitants, and so the data are representative of urban Mexico. A 
sample of 203,550 workers is yielded. 
Table 1 presents the full definitions of the variables included in the analysis.  Table 2 presents the 
sample mean values of these variables.  Sample mean monthly earnings are approximately 1,564 (e7.355) pesos 
whereas mean weekly hours worked are about 41 (e3.718) hours. Approximately 38% of these workers were 
female.  Since the geographical scope of this survey has greatly increased over time, it is not surprising that 
substantially more of these workers are drawn from the 1999 than from the 1987 ENEU.  Sample mean years 
of schooling are a little over 9. About 3.4% of these 203,550 workers are employed in the maquiladora sub-
sector of manufacturing, about 2.6% in the sector producing goods the imports of which were liberalized 
relatively rapidly by NAFTA, and about 10.9% in the sector producing goods the imports of which were 
                                                 
5 Robertson (2000, 2004) too uses labor micro-data, though for the purposes of basic illustration. liberalized relatively slowly by the terms of this Preferential Trading Arrangement, with the remainder engaged 
in sectors producing non-tradeables and the few supply-managed goods excluded from NAFTA.   
Table 3 presents OLS estimates of the Mincer earnings function (1). As expected, log monthly earning 
increases in weekly hours worked. In keeping with human capital theory, log monthly earning significantly 
increases in years of work experience. Ceteris paribus, women earn less than men. Married workers, 
entrepreneurs, and those employed in the formal sector of the economy earn significantly more than others.  It 
appears workers in micro (1 – 5 employees) firms earn less than the solitary self-employed, whereas those in 
small (6 – 50 employees), medium (51 – 250 employees), and large (more than 250 employees) firms earn more.  It 
is indicated that workers in the border (with the US) region and in the northern region excluding the border 
region earn more, whereas workers in the nation’s southern region earn less, than workers in the central region.  
By these estimates, the rate of return to schooling in the services sector, one producing non-tradeables, was 
2.4% in 1987.   
It may be noted that despite the concentration of foreign direct investment in maquiladoras and these 
firms’ export-orientation, factors credited with speeding the rate of skill-biased technical progress, the statistical 
insignificance of the interaction schooling × maquila × year 1999 suggests that increase between 1987 and 1999 in 
the rate of return to schooling in maquiladoras was not greater than in the rest of manufacturing.  
That the estimated coefficients of schooling × fastlib × year 1999  and  schooling × slowlib × year 1999 are 
positive with the variables significant is consistent with previous findings (for example, Hanson and Harrison, 
1999, and Robertson, 2000) of a positive effect upon returns to skill of  Mexico’s joining the GATT in 1986. It 
may be noted, however, that rise in returns to skill is less pronounced in industries producing tradeables the 
imports of which were liberalized more rapidly by NAFTA than in industries producing goods the imports of 
which were liberalized relatively slowly: the estimated coefficient of schooling × fastlib × year 1999  is smaller than 
that of schooling × slowlib × year 1999  with the difference significant at the 1% level.  As argued, the above may 
be taken as indicative of a reversal, owing to NAFTA, of the GATT induced rise in returns to skill, a reversal 
more marked in the sector more rapidly liberalized by this phased trade treaty.  In other words, this finding 
supports the view (e.g., Robertson, 2004) that NAFTA has lowered rates of return to skill in Mexico.  North-
South trade liberalization may, then, lower rates of return to skill in the South.  Finally, since the rate of return 
to schooling appears to have risen in net even in the more slowly liberalized sector, it does not appear that 
NAFTA has offset the rise in returns to skill from Mexico’s joining the GATT.  
IV. Conclusion 
This study exploits the phased nature of tariff reductions under NAFTA to attempt identification of the effect 
of this instance of North-South trade liberalization upon returns to skill, measured as rates of return to 
schooling, in Mexico.  It is held that Mexico’s joining the GATT in 1986 raised its workers’ returns to skill 
whereas NAFTA has reversed this trend (for example, Robertson 2004). This study uncovers evidence from 
Mexican labor micro-data consistent with this view.  It is found that while returns to skill in industries 
producing tradeables have risen, ceteris paribus, since Mexico embarked upon trade liberalization by joining the 
GATT in 1986, rise in returns to skill was less pronounced by 1999 in industries producing goods the imports 
of which were liberalized relatively rapidly by NAFTA, launched in 1994, than in industries producing goods 
the imports of which were liberalized relatively slowly by this phased tripartite treaty.  This is taken to be due to 
NAFTA reversing the preceding increase in returns to skill from Mexico’s joining GATT, since it is plausible 
this reversal was of greater magnitude in the sector producing goods the imports of which were liberalized 
relatively rapidly by NAFTA.  Hence, this study suggests trade with developed nations may lower returns to 
skill in developing nations. It is speculated this may slow the pace of private human capital accumulation in 
developing nations, with negative consequences for their economic growth. 
 TABLE 1  Definitions of Variables 
  
Variable Definition 
log earnings  natural log of  monthly earnings in 1999 pesos 
log hours  natural log of hours worked during week prior to interview 
experience  years of work experience (age – schooling – 6) 
female  = 1 if female 
married  = 1 if married 
formal  = 1 if employed in formal sector 
owner  =1 if entrepreneur 
year 1999  =1 if drawn from the 1999 ENEU  
micro (firm size; omitted category is ‘self-
employed with no employees’) 
= 1 if employed in a firm with 1 – 5 employees 
small (firm size)  =1 if employed in a firm with 6 – 50 employees 
medium (firm size)  =1 if employed in a firm with 51 – 250 employees 
large (firm size)  =1 if employed in a firm with more than 250 employees 
border (region; omitted category is ‘central 
region’) 
=1 if lives on the Mexico – US border 
north (region)  =1 if lives in a northern state of Mexico not bordering the US 
south (region)  =1 if lives in a southern state of Mexico 
professional (occupation; omitted category 
is ‘laborer’) 
=1 if a professional 
technical (occupation)  =1 if a technician 
managerial (occupation)  =1 if a manager 
farm (industrial class; omitted category is 
‘services’) 
= 1 if employed in agricultural sector, including agro-based industry
mine or electric (industrial class)  = 1 if employed in mining or power sectors 
manufacturing (industrial class)  = 1 if employed in the manufacturing sector 
construction (industrial class)  = 1 if employed in the construction sector 
commerce (industrial class)  = 1 if employed in the commerce sector 
maquila  = 1 if employed in the maquiladora sub-sector of manufacturing 
fastlib  =1 if employed in a sector, excluding the maquiladora sub-sector, with 
100% tariff reduction by 1999 under NAFTA 
slowlib  =1 if employed in a sector, excluding the maquiladora sub-sector, with 
less than a 100% tariff reduction by 1999 under NAFTA 
farm × year 1999  interaction of farm and year 1999 
mine or electric × year 1999  interaction of mine or electric and year 1999 
manufacturing × year 1999  interaction of manufacturing and year 1999 
construction × year 1999  interaction of construction and year 1999 
commerce × year 1999  interaction of commerce and year 1999 
maquila × year 1999  interaction of maquila and year 1999 
fastlib × year 1999  interaction of fastlib and year 1999 
slowlib × year 1999  interaction of slowlib and year 1999 
schooling   years of formal education 
schooling × farm  interaction of schooling and farm 
schooling × mine or electric  interaction of schooling and mine or electric 
schooling × manufacturing  interaction of schooling and manufacturing 
schooling × construction  interaction of schooling and construction TABLE 1  Definitions of Variables (continued) 
 
schooling × commerce  interaction of schooling and commerce 
schooling ×maquila  interaction of schooling and maquila 
schooling × fastlib  interaction of schooling and fastlib 
schooling × slowlib  interaction of schooling and slowlib 
schooling × year 1999  interaction of schooling and year 1999 
schooling × farm × year 1999  interaction of schooling, farm, and year 1999 
schooling × mine or electric × year 1999  interaction of schooling, mine or electric, and year 1999 
schooling × manufacturing × year 1999  interaction of schooling, manufacturing, and year 1999 
schooling × construction × year 1999  interaction of schooling, construction, and year 1999 
schooling × commerce × year 1999  interaction of schooling, commerce, and year 1999 
schooling × maquila × year 1999  interaction of schooling, maquila, and year 1999 
schooling × fastlib × year 1999  interaction of schooling, fastlib, and year 1999 
schooling × slowlib × year 1999  interaction of schooling, slowlib, and year 1999 
 
 TABLE 2  Sample Statistics 
(n = 203,550) 
 
Variable Mean  S.D. 
log earnings  7.355 1.684 
log hours  3.718 0.422 
experience  18.229 13.248 
female  0.375 0.484 
married  0.600 0.490 
formal  0.791 0.407 
owner  0.257 0.437 
year 1999  0.793 0.405 
micro (firm size)  0.250 0.433 
small (firm size)  0.177 0.382 
medium (firm size)  0.070 0.255 
large (firm size)  0.354 0.478 
border (region)  0.124 0.329 
north (region)  0.399 0.490 
south (region)  0.141 0.348 
professional (occupation)  0.096 0.294 
technical (occupation)  0.042 0.200 
managerial (occupation)  0.115 0.319 
farm (industrial class)  0.016 0.126 
mine or electric (industrial class)  0.013 0.115 
manufacturing (industrial class)  0.227 0.419 
construction (industrial class)  0.058 0.233 
commerce (industrial class)  0.200 0.400 
maquila  0.034 0.182 
fastlib  0.026 0.160 
slowlib  0.109 0.312 
farm × year 1999  0.013 0.112 
mine or electric × year 1999  0.010 0.100 
manufacturing × year 1999    0.171 0.377 
construction × year 1999  0.046 0.209 
commerce × year 1999  0.161 0.367 
maquila × year 1999  0.025 0.157 
fastlib × year 1999  0.146 0.353 
slowlib × year 1999  0.361 0.480 
schooling   9.340 4.446 
schooling × farm  0.119 1.078 
schooling × mine or electric  0.150 1.391 
schooling × manufacturing  1.985 4.084 
schooling × construction  0.430 2.017 
schooling × commerce  1.802 4.025 
schooling ×maquila  0.297 1.713 
schooling × fastlib  2.215 5.051 
schooling × slowlib  4.084 5.340 
  
TABLE 2  Sample Statistics (continued) 
(n = 203,550) 
 
schooling × year 1999  7.567 5.567 
schooling × farm × year 1999  0.096 0.979 
schooling × mine or electric × year 1999  0.116 1.240 
schooling × manufacturing × year 1999  1.536 3.730 
schooling × construction × year 1999  0.351 1.847 
schooling × commerce × year 1999  1.481 3.748 
schooling × maquila × year 1999  0.225 1.515 
Key Variables    
schooling × fastlib × year 1999  1.746 4.633 
schooling × slowlib × year 1999  3.348 5.149 
 TABLE 3  Determinants of Log Monthly Earnings 
Dependent Variable = log earnings, OLS Estimates 
 
Variable Coefficient  T-Ratio 
constant  2.632*** 67.29 
log hours  1.027*** 133.02 
experience  0.005*** 16.27 
female  -0.311*** -45.9 
married  0.066*** 9.78 
formal  0.068*** 6.47 
owner  1.095*** 113.25 
year 1999  -0.195*** -6.99 
micro (firm size)  -0.444***  -37.41 
small (firm size)  0.815*** 55.32 
medium (firm size)  1.035*** 58.11 
large (firm size)  1.207*** 81.2 
border (region) 0.383***  32.8 
north (region)  0.153*** 21.18 
south (region)  -0.065*** -7.04 
professional (occupation) 0.586***  43.81 
technical (occupation)  0.289*** 18.55 
managerial (occupation)  0.593*** 55.36 
farm (industrial class)  -0.946***  -9.71 
mine or electric (industrial class)  -0.194  -1.46 
manufacturing (industrial class)  -0.060 -1.44 
construction (industrial class)  0.273*** 4.72 
commerce (industrial class)  -1.016*** -23 
maquila  -0.494*** -5.43 
fastlib  -0.152*** -7.05 
slowlib  -0.165*** -11.92 
farm × year 1999  -0.574*** -5.13 
mine or electric × year 1999  0.019 0.12 
manufacturing × year 1999  -0.229*** -4.89 
construction × year 1999  0.183*** 2.76 
commerce × year 1999  0.253*** 4.91 
maquila × year 1999  0.023 0.22 
fastlib × year 1999  -0.146*** -5.66 
slowlib × year 1999  -0.304*** -13.62 
schooling   0.024*** 8.32 
schooling × farm  -0.020 -1.58 
schooling × mine or electric  0.023* 1.93 
schooling × manufacturing  0.003 0.77 
schooling × construction  -0.009 -1.2 
schooling × commerce  0.068*** 13.74 
schooling ×maquila  0.004 0.42 
schooling × fastlib  -0.010*** -4.81 
schooling × slowlib  -0.029*** -13.79 
 TABLE 3  Determinants of Log Monthly Earnings (continued) 
 
Variable Coefficient  T-Ratio 
schooling × year 1999  -0.007** -2.15 
schooling × farm × year 1999  0.049*** 3.52 
schooling × mine or electric × year 1999  0.012 0.89 
schooling × manufacturing × year 1999  0.013*** 2.69 
schooling × construction × year 1999  -0.018** -2.18 
schooling × commerce × year 1999  -0.049*** -8.8 
schooling × maquila × year 1999  0.010 0.89 
Key Variables    
schooling × fastlib × year 1999  0.031*** 10.52 
schooling × slowlib × year 1999  0.048*** 15.91 
R2 =  0.3614 
n =  203,550 
*, **, and *** denote significance at, respectively, the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
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